Constitutional Convergence and Customary International Law by Crootof, Rebecca
University of Richmond 
UR Scholarship Repository 
Law Faculty Publications School of Law 
2013 
Constitutional Convergence and Customary International Law 
Rebecca Crootof 
University of Richmond - School of Law, rcrootof@richmond.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rebecca Crootof, Constitutional Convergence and Customary International Law, 54 Harv. Int'l L.J. Online 
195 (2013). 
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu. 





LAW  JOURNAL 
  
PRINT RESPONSE Online 
MAY 2013 Volume 54 
Constitutional Convergence and Customary 
International Law 
 Responding to Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons, Getting to 
Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 53 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 61 (2012). 
 
Rebecca Crootof* 
In Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons study the effects of post-World 
War II human rights texts on domestic constitutions, with a particular focus on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
1
 After analyzing 680 constitutional systems compiled by the 
                                                 
 
* Law clerk, The Honorable John M. Walker, Jr. The opinions expressed herein are my own 
and should not be attributed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit or any judge 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals. 
1 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, 
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61 (2012). 





 to create a list of seventy-four constitutionally 
protected rights,
3
 the authors evaluate whether countries incorporate internationally 
codified human rights into their domestic constitutions, whether ratification of 
international agreements affects the probability of rights incorporation, and whether 
such incorporation increases the likelihood that countries enforce rights in practice.
4
  
After tabulating the data and running random-effects models, the authors find “a 
significant upward shift in the similarity to the [Universal Declaration] among 
constitutions written after 1948,”
5
 leading them to conclude that the Universal 
Declaration acted as a “template” from which constitutional drafters could select 
rights.
6
 They also demonstrate—after controlling for the era and a state’s prior 
constitutional tradition—that post-1966 constitutions from states that ratified the 
ICCPR are more likely to include its codified rights in subsequent constitutions than 
non-ratifying states.
7
 Finally, relying on Freedom House’s civil liberties index, the 
authors conclude that human rights agreement ratification and constitutional 
incorporation is correlated with improved human rights practice on the ground.
8
  
This ambitious project and its quantitative and qualitative findings are applicable to a 
wide range of international law scholarship. Getting to Rights offers new evidence 
relevant to convergence theory, provides empirical support for speculation on the 
effects of international agreements on domestic law, and determines that human 
rights are most effectively enforced when international and domestic law are applied 
in tandem. It also suggests a methodology for similar future research into the 
influence of supranational texts—such as the European, Inter-American, or African 
Conventions on Human Rights—on domestic constitutions. 
                                                 
 
2 The Project “records the content of national constitutions as well as international 
instruments[] for all constitutions of independent nation-states since 1789.” Id. at 69. The 
authors considered a sample of 680 systems from the total 839 systems promulgated between 
1789 and 2006, not including amendments. Id. 
3 Id. at 72. 
4 Id. at 64. 
5 Id. at 77. 
6 Id. at 81. 
7 Id. at 87–88. 
8 Id. at 63–64. This last conclusion is the most controversial. Unfortunately, however, and 
perhaps due to the grand scope of the article, the authors do not provide a thorough 
description of their methodology or an explicit consideration of all potential sources of bias 
and distortion. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights 
Treaties, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 171, 175–77 (2003) (noting potential distortions in the raw data 
collected by organizations like Freedom House); see also Rebecca Crootof, Power in Numbers 
(unpublished manuscript) (discussing common errors in empirical studies of the effects of 
human rights treaties). The lack of a detailed explanation in this Part makes the authors’ 
conclusion less convincing than it otherwise might have been. 




From this garden of subjects, this response focuses on one offshoot: the 
consequences of the authors’ data on rights convergence for customary international 
law theory. After briefly reviewing the definitions of customary international law and 
jus cogens, I discuss the potential implications of converging constitutionally protected 
rights. I then examine the authors’ data in light of these hypotheses and conclude that, 
from this point forward, scholars who argue that certain norms have obtained 
customary international law or jus cogens status will have to address the Getting to Rights 
data. Due to the necessary brevity of this response, however, I leave more complete 
analyses of individual rights to others. 
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUS COGENS 
Under the classic or “traditional”
9
 theory of customary international law, a norm 
attains binding status if the general and consistent practice of states demonstrates that 
the norm is accepted as law by the world community.
10
 State practice provides 
evidence of custom, while opinio juris—the conviction that a norm is legally binding—
states the “attitudinal requirement.”
11
 The classical formation focuses on state action, 
invoking opinio juris only to distinguish between obligatory and customary practices.
12
 





international law, some contemporary legal scholars argue for reversing the classical 
requirements by downplaying or entirely ignoring state practice and focusing instead 
on the existence of opinio juris.
15
  
According to classicists, customary international law develops slowly through state 
practice; advocates of modern customary international law argue that it can arise 
almost instantaneously based on statements evidencing opinio juris.
16
 Under either 
methodology, norms are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and there is little 
                                                 
 
9 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 757 (2001). 
10 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b) (defining international custom 
“as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); see also North Sea Continental Shelf 
(FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 44 (Feb. 20). 
11 J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 
(2000).  
12 Roberts, supra note 9, at 758. 
13 John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1175, 1199–1201 (2007). 
14 Kelly, supra note 11, at 454–55; Roberts, supra note 9, at 757. 
15 See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 546 (1993). 
16 Roberts, supra note 9, at 759. 
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agreement as to what constitutes opinio juris, state practice, and—by extension—the 
complete body of customary international law.
17
  
Peremptory or jus cogens norms are distinct from other customary international law 
norms in that they do not permit derogation, even in times of emergency.
18
 Broad 
prohibitions against genocide, slavery, murder or disappearance, torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, 
and systemic racial discrimination are generally recognized as jus cogens norms.
19
 As 
with other customary international law, however, there is no clear consensus on which 
rights or prohibitions have obtained jus cogens status
20
—though that has not chilled 
scholars from promoting their pet norms.
21
 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERGENCE FOR CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
As noted in Getting to Rights, “constitutional commitments carry unique weight in 
terms of authority” for all countries.
22
 In democracies, constitutional provisions are 
legally enforceable and will trump other domestic laws and policies.
23
 In autocracies, 
constitutions are used to advertise fundamental policies.
24
 “For both democracies and 
autocracies, then, constitutions are used as signals of policy goals, expressing 
                                                 
 
17 Kelly, supra note 11, at 450 (arguing that “there is neither a common understanding of 
how customary international legal norms are formed, nor agreement on the content of those 
norms”); Roberts, supra note 9, at 765–69 (outlining issues with identifying custom under 
either the traditional or modern approach). 
18 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 344, 8 I.L.M. 679 (“[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.”). 
19 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 cmts. d–i, § 
102 cmt. k. (1987). 
20 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Court of Justice 
may be tasked with determining when a specific norm is peremptory, but the standards it must 
apply are not codified. See VCLT, supra note 18, art. 66(a). 
21 For a humorous discussion of this habit, see Anthony D’Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s 
Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990). 
22 Getting to Rights, supra note 1, at 82. 
23 Id. at 82–83. 
24 Id. (using China as an example). 








At least in democracies, where constitutional provisions express requirements that 
states are likely to believe they are obligated to uphold, they may serve as evidence of 
opinio juris.
26
 The assumption that a constitutional provision represents opinio juris may 
be undermined, however, where a state adopts a norm as a result of coercion, as 
opposed to through persuasion or acculturation.
27
 
If the state actually enforces a constitutional provision, especially through legal 
proceedings, the provision may also codify state practice.
28
 Looking to constitutions 
for evidence of state practice requires a more nuanced analysis than simply examining 
the text, however, as any given norm may not be uniformly applied.
29
 To the extent 
that constitutions evolve from cultural identity and values, the understanding of what 
is protected or prohibited by a certain provision as a matter of law will likely vary 
from state to state. In one country, for example, the right to life may be understood to 
prohibit abortions; in another, it will not be relevant to that discussion. Additionally 
and alternatively, even if a specific right enshrined in a majority of constitutions 
protects the same activity as a matter of law—say, the presumption of innocence in 
criminal trials—that right may not be enforced in practice. 
                                                 
 
25 Id. (emphasis in original); see also Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signal, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 
85–86 (2002). 
26 Interestingly, stable authoritarian states are more likely to make customary international 
law directly applicable in their constitutions than are stable democratic states. See Tom 
Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh & Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why 
National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008  U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 233 fig. 3. 
27 See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (arguing that states change their 
behavior with regard to human rights as a result of coercion, persuasion, or acculturation). 
28 See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO 
THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2000) (noting that the 
decisions of domestic courts should be considered state practice); see also M. O. Chibundu, 
Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1069 (1999); Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in Domestic Courts and the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State Case, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 819, 820 (2012) (observing that the ICJ 
relied more heavily on national court cases as evidence of state practice than in previous 
decisions). Using court decisions as confirmation of state practice is fundamentally different 
from relying on court decisions attempting to identify state practice; the former are some of 
many types of evidence, while the latter are assessments that are often undermined by the fact 
that domestic courts tend to have a limited perspective and understanding of what constitutes 
state practice. See Kelly, supra note 11, at 506; Roberts, supra note 9, at 775. 
29 See, e.g., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 21 (“For State practice to create a 
rule of customary law, it must be virtually uniform, both internally and collectively.”).  
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At least in broad strokes, however, one might expect that, as “[t]he international law 
of human rights and national constitutional law inspire and influence each other[, they 
will] become increasingly similar.”
30
 In other words, to the extent that constitutional 
provisions constitute evidence of opinio juris or state practice, one would anticipate 
finding a rough correlation between converging constitutional rights and rights 
generally accepted as customary international law or jus cogens. While by no means 
conclusive, evidence of rights convergence—or the lack thereof—is relevant in 
evaluating whether a particular right has obtained customary international law status, 




In Getting to Rights, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons have provided scholars with a 
wealth of information on which rights appear in modern constitutions—information 
with which proponents of certain norms having obtained customary international law 
status will have to grapple. 
III. EXAMINING GETTING TO RIGHTS’S DATA 
Of the rights examined in Getting to Rights, some “appear to be so central that almost 
nine of every ten contemporary constitutions include them.”
32
 These rights include 
freedom of religion (appearing in 88.9% of constitutions promulgated between 1949–
2006, with an increase of 38.9% when compared with constitutions promulgated in 
1789–1914); freedom of expression or speech (86.9%, +18.0%), freedom of assembly 
(85.7%, +36.5%), and freedom of association (87.4%, +44.0%).
33
  
Other rights protected in more than half of contemporary constitutions include the 
right to freedom of opinion, thought, and conscience (76.3%, +15.6%); the right to 
own property (75.1%, +25.9%); freedom of movement (74.9%, +20.8%); the right to 
privacy (72.9%, +25.4%); protection from unjustified restraint (71.4%, +29.6%); the 
prohibition of ex post facto punishment (70.9%, +14.3%); the right to form or join 
trade unions (69.4%, +65.3%); the right to counsel (64.0%, +52.5%); the mention of 
nulla poena sine lege—the legal principle that one cannot be punished for an action that 
is not prohibited by law—or some equivalent (63.7%, +9.6%); the right to life (60.3%, 
                                                 
 
30 Louis Henkin, Sibley Lecture, March 1994: Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 40 (1995/1996). 
31 Compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (1980) (citing provisions in foreign 
constitutions as evidence of customary international law), with Vlad F. Perju, The Puzzling 
Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 167, 169–70 (noting that “[t]he very 
fact of convergence [between international and foreign law] might be the effect of a norm of 
international law on domestic legal systems”). 
32 Getting to Rights, supra note 1, at 72. 
33 Id. app. 




+36.5%); the presumption of innocence in trials (60.3%, +54.6%); the prohibition of 
torture (58.0%, +29.3%); the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
(57.7%, +32.3%); the requirement of public trials (57.7%, +24.1%); some reference to 
a state duty to protect or promote culture (52.6%, +49.3%); and freedom of the press 
(53.4%, +9.1%).
34
 As is evident from these figures, in addition to appearing in a 
majority of modern constitutions, certain of these rights have also recently increased 
dramatically in popularity. 
With the exception only of the right to counsel, each of the rights that appear in a 
majority of modern constitutions is included in the Universal Declaration.
35
 It is 
unclear if these rights have obtained binding customary international law status or if 
they remain optional obligations which states may elect to assume. As noted above, 
constitutional texts alone will not be sufficient evidence of opinio juris or state practice, 
either because constitutional provisions are not binding law in some countries or are 
not enforced equally. Nonetheless, certain rights’ majority status or evidence of their 
relatively recent popularity may bolster arguments that they are well on their way to 
becoming binding customary international law. This data may be of particular 
relevance in responding to those who highlight sporadic but dramatic violations of 
human rights as evidence of a lack of state practice.
36
  
Although almost every right has increased in prevalence since its introduction, few are 
close to universal: “The vast majority of rights . . . have penetrated fewer than half of 
contemporary constitutions and appear to be optional constitutional features.”
37
 This 
finding will need to be addressed directly by those scholars who argue that any of 
these majority-minority rights—such as the right to health care (appearing in 38.3% of 
contemporary constitutions), the right to a safe or healthy working environment 
(26.6%); limitations on child employment (21.1%), or the provision of special rights 




Of particular interest are those rights that failed to gain traction. The Getting to Rights 
data suggests that “rights, once introduced, generally spread across countries and 
                                                 
 
34 Id. 
35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), arts. 3, 5, 9, 10–13, 17–20, 22, 23, 27 (Dec. 10, 1948). Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Simmons link the right to counsel’s success to its inclusion in the ICCPR. Id. at 73. 
36 See Roberts, supra note 9, at 777 (arguing that the understanding of state practice should 
be broadened to include, inter alia, patterns of obligations being observed as well as evidence of 
obligations being breached). 
37 Getting to Rights, supra note 1, at 72. 
38 Id. app. 
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maintain their [aggregate] popularity.”
39
 Nonetheless, certain rights declined in 
popularity, sometimes significantly. From constitutions promulgated in 1789–1914 to 
those promulgated in 1949–2006, the following rights experienced notable decreases 
in popularity: the right to citizenship based on being born within a state’s jurisdiction 
(jus soli citizenship) (-28.5%); the right of petition (-26.9%); the prohibition on the use 
of corporal punishment (-24.9%); the prohibition on censorship (-23.5%); the 
requirement of a jury or any form of citizen participation in criminal trials (-22.6%); 
intellectual property rights (-18.4%); the prohibition of slavery, servitude, or forced 
labor (-8.2%); the right to bear arms (-6.8%); the right to transfer property freely        
(-3.5%); the right or possibility of pretrial release (-2.1%); the right of testacy, or the 
right to leave property to one’s heirs (-0.8%); and the right of the accused to silence or 
protection from self-incrimination (-0.5%).
40
 
These negative or flat trajectories are not necessarily the result of certain rights being 
written out of constitutions by subsequent drafters. A right’s declining popularity 
might also be a side effect of a greater number of constitutions in later periods. 
Alternatively, as modern constitutions are more likely to incorporate international 
human rights by reference,
41
 their drafters may have felt that explicitly detailing 
certain rights would be needlessly repetitive.
42
 Of course, another possibility is that 
these rights simply lost their import,
43
 and therefore a greater percentage of drafters 
in the later periods decided against including rights that other countries—and 
sometimes a majority of countries
44
—had once considered constitutionally necessary. 
Any scholar arguing that one of these rights has obtained customary international law 
status will now need to provide a convincing argument explaining the right’s declining 
popularity in domestic constitutions. 
Finally, and oddly, it appears as though jus cogens rights are relatively underrepresented 
in modern constitutions. The right to protection from unjustified restraint and the 
                                                 
 
39 Id. at 72. 
40 Id. app. 
41 Ginsburg et al., supra note 26, at 209 (noting that “the proportion of constitutions 
incorporating customary international law in the domestic legal order doubled from the pre-
1914 to the post-1944 periods”). 
42 For example, of 283 constitutions adopted in or after 1945, 69 mentioned and 24 
specifically incorporated the Universal Declaration. Id. at 208 fig. 1. 
43 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons hypothesize that the decline in these rights’ popularity 
may be attributable to their exclusion from the Universal Declaration. Getting to Rights, supra 
note 1, at 81. However, they acknowledge that some of these rights were already declining in 
popularity prior to the 1948. Id. at 81 n.67. 
44 The majority of constitutions promulgated between 1789 and 1914 included the right to 
petition (73.8%); the right to jus soli citizenship (59.0%); and the prohibition of slavery, 
servitude, or forced labor (50.8%). Id. app. None of these rights appeared in the majority of 
constitutions promulgated between 1949 and 2006. Id.  




right to a speedy trial (which relate to the prohibition of prolonged arbitrary 
detention) appear in 71.4% and 24.3% of modern constitutions, respectively.
45
 The 
right to life (which might be equated with the prohibition against murder) appears in 
only 60.3% of contemporary constitutions; the prohibition of torture appears in only 
58.0%; the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in only 57.7%; and 
the prohibition of slavery, servitude, or forced labor in less than half—merely 42.6% 
of post-1949 constitutions.
46
 The requirement that the names of those imprisoned be 
recorded in a register (which relates to the prohibition on disappearance) appears in 
only 2.0% of modern constitutions.
47
 Prohibitions of genocide and systemic racial 
discrimination do not appear in the authors’ “comprehensive” list of rights at all.
48
 
Some might argue that modern constitutions’ silence on these theoretically 
peremptory norms undermines their jus cogens status, as it demonstrates that they are 
not universally accepted. Others might respond that these rights’ relative absence 
highlights their strength, insofar as they are so broadly accepted that there is no need 
to mention them in constitutional texts. A constitutional prohibition against genocide, 
for example, seems somewhat superfluous. Meanwhile, many constitutions may not 
explicitly forbid slavery or disappearances despite accepting the prohibitions as 




* * * * * 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons are not the first to remark upon the absence of 
human rights protections in domestic constitutions.
50
 Unlike previous scholars, 
however, the Getting to Rights authors have made a concrete contribution to legal 
academia by creating a comprehensive data set detailing which rights are included in 
domestic constitutions and how each right’s popularity has changed over time. 
Regardless of whether he or she adheres to the classical or modern theory, a future 
scholar wishing to argue that a particular right has obtained customary international 
law status will need to confront and discuss this hard data. 
                                                 
 
45 Getting to Rights, supra note 1, app. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 72, app.; see also id. at 74 (“These seventy-two rights represent any right from the list 
of seventy-four in 
the Appendix that has been included in at least five percent of constitutions at any given 
time since 1789.”). The Getting to Rights data highlight the intent of the original constitutional 
drafters and does not take constitutional amendments that fail to completely overhaul a 
constitutional system into account. Id. at 69. 
49 See, e.g., Anthony A. D’Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for 
Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (1995/1996). 
50 Id. at 53. 
